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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The displacement crisis of recent years is unprecedented: the UNHCR (2017b) estimate that a record 
65 million people were forced to leave their homes because of violence, conflict or natural disasters 
in 2016. Europe has seen some of the effects of this, with a record number of arrivals in 2014 and 
2015 (Eurostat,  2017) and more than 10,000 lives lost in the attempt to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea (IOM, 2018). Amongst several policy responses, donors have announced large development aid 
packages as an attempt to address the ‘root causes’ of migration. This policy response has a long 
history (Carling & Talleraas, 2016), even if the scale of displacement is new. One recent example 
of high-profile ear-marked funds is the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and ad-
dressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa). The 
European Commission's (2016a) stated aim is to ‘...invest in long-term economic and social develop-
ment, improving people's life and tackling the drivers of migration’. With over 4 billion euro already 
committed, this is a major initiative, but represents only part of a consistent strategy (Latek, 2016).
This study asks whether that policy lever is effective, specifically: Has development aid reduced 
irregular migration to Italy? We only use one destination as there is limited comparability of national 
migration statistics (Raymer, Wiśniowski, Forster, Smith, & Bijak, 2013) and potentially large prob-
lems of double counting. There are three main entry points to Europe: Italy, Greece and Spain. We 
have chosen to study Italy as it has higher levels of irregular immigrants than Spain, and much more 
consistent flows than Greece (which saw a large spike in 2015). Two dependent variables are used, 
both of which capture flows: the number of asylum applicants and the number of apprehensions at 
border. By using both, we are able to test the robustness of insights. A parsimonious set of controls 
is used in panel data for 147 countries over 14 years, with a now standard structural equation model 
approach to control for endogeneity.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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A number of studies have examined the link between aid and migration, often expressing scepticism 
of any ability to reduce migratory flows (Clemens & Postel, 2018; De Haas, 2007). However, three 
recent empirical papers find a negative link, with more aid meaning lower immigration, in general 
(Lanati & Thiele, 2018), for rural aid specifically (Gamso & Yuldashev, 2018a) or for governance aid 
specifically (Gamso & Yuldashev, 2018b). On the other side, Berthélemy, Beuran, and Maurel (2009) 
found a positive effect of aid on migration stocks below a critical income threshold of PPP$ 7,300, and 
Menard and Gary (2018) confirmed an increase for specific donor–recipient pairs in the short run.
Until recently, this empirical evidence has focused upon regular migration. This limitation has 
often been blamed on poor data availability. However, the expressed goal of aid is typically to reduce 
irregular migration, and this paper is able to judge aid according to its own criteria. Furthermore, 
irregular migration is far from trivial. For the last three years of data available (2014–16), inflows of 
regular migrants to Italy have numbered approximately in the range 230,000–250,000 (OECD, 2017). 
For irregular migrants, the range has been approximately between 150,000 and 180,000 over the 
same period (Frontex, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). In other words, irregular migration is both the type 
of migration that policymakers wish to discourage using aid, and important in terms of sheer scale. 
The only exceptions we are aware of to the broad focus on regular migrants are Vogler and Rotte 
(2000) and recent papers from Dreher, Fuchs, and Langlotz (2019) and Murat (2020). Vogler and 
Rotte (2000) look at determinants of asylum seekers to Germany, using bilateral aid as a proxy for 
bilateral contacts. Dreher et al. (2019) and Murat (2020) use data from UNHCR to measure ‘refugee 
inflows’ and asylum applications, respectively. However, there are a number of weaknesses that do 
not appear to have been overcome, discussed in greater detail in Sections 2 and 3.
Our main finding is that any effect of aid on irregular migration is small and tends to be insignifi-
cant. In the baseline specification, the positive relationship between bilateral aid and asylum applica-
tions is found significant at the 5% level. However, the effect size is small (a 1% increase in bilateral 
aid is associated with a 0.017% increase in asylum applications), and the result is not robust to other 
estimators. The effect of aid on border crossings is not consistently estimated to be either positive or 
negative, but is consistently small or not significant. We find the main drivers of irregular migration 
to Italy include the migrants’ network at destination, income at origin, population and the presence of 
violent conflict at origin (this echoes the qualitative evidence, see Crawley, Düvell, Jones, McMahon, 
& Sigona, 2016). We also find that migration flows have a significant influence on the amount of both 
bilateral and total aid a country of origin receives: if endogeneity is not completely dealt with, there 
will be a positive bias.
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the liter-
ature on aid and migration; Section 3 outlines the empirical approach and data; Section 4 presents the 
results, with discussion and conclusion found in Sections 5 and 6.
2 |  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Why might we expect aid to influence the number of immigrants a country receives? From a theoreti-
cal perspective, there are three main channels. First, neoclassical theories posit that the main driver 
of migration is the income differential between sending and receiving countries (Borjas, 1989). Thus, 
if aid is able to reduce this differential by improving the incomes of those in recipient countries, aid 
would reduce the attractiveness of migration and so reduce the number of immigrants (Böhning & 
Schloeter-Paredes, 1994). This simple theory is closest to that espoused by politicians in their expla-
nation of using aid to address the ‘root causes’.
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Second, theories of the migration transition recognise that migration has costs as well as benefits, 
thus leading to a non-linear relationship with economic development (Skeldon, 1997). The poorest 
are unlikely to be able to afford to migrate as they lack the necessary resources, while the richest are 
not attracted because of small income differentials. So, aid at specific levels of income may contrib-
ute to loosening budget constraints enough to cause an increase in migration (De Haas, 2007). The 
turning point has been estimated in the range of $6,000–$8,000 per capita in PPP (Clemens, 2014; 
Dao, Docquier, Parsons, & Peri, 2018), with increased economic growth below that point expected to 
increase emigration.
Third, while the two proceeding theories essentially imply that aid has no differential effects de-
pending upon who gives the aid, theories of the migrant network argue that bilateral ties cause greater 
migration (Massey, 1990). So, bilateral aid might reinforce these ties and cause greater migration from 
an aid recipient to that specific aid donor (Berthélemy et al., 2009). The channels for this may be in 
a general positive impression of a country, or in specific contacts made during the course of an aid 
project.
With these theories in mind, we now turn to the empirical evidence. The most important recent 
paper on the effect of aid on migration is Berthélemy et  al.  (2009), who find positive impacts on 
immigrant stocks for both bilateral aid and total aid. Specifically, a 10% increase in bilateral or total 
aid is associated with increases in migrant stocks of approximately 3% and 1.5%, respectively. This 
result comes from a gravity model covering 22 donors and 187 sending countries for the year 2000. 
Using a simultaneous equation model, Berthélemy et al. (2009) attempt to correct for the endogeneity 
of aid by estimating its allocation as a function of GDP, population and institutional development at 
origin as well as bilateral trade and historical links. While a great step forward, the chosen migration 
variable is problematic as it measures stocks of regular migrants. They estimate the effect of aid (over 
5–10 years) on immigration and emigration decisions that took place over a much longer time period. 
This problem is compounded because of endogeneity concerns. Bermeo and Leblang (2015) report 
that immigrant stocks are positively associated with aid allocation (possibly as immigrants are able to 
lobby for aid to their home country). Unless the effect of migrant stocks on aid allocation is controlled 
for, any estimate of the effect of aid on migration would be positively biased due to omitted variable 
bias. Given aid is found to have a positive effect, we are left to wonder whether this estimate is affected 
by the endogeneity of aid.
Menard and Gary (2018) also find a positive result of aid on migration, having dealt with some of 
the weaknesses of Berthélemy et al. (2009). They use data on migrant flows over 2000–10 and add a 
third equation for trade flows. They find a 1% increase in aid is associated with a 0.18% increase in 
migration. This suggests that using flows as a dependent variable makes the positive effect of bilateral 
aid weaker: it is about 60% the size of Berthélemy et al.'s (2009) estimate. Menard and Gary (2018) 
also find a large effect of migration on aid: a 1% increase in migration is associated with a 0.72% in-
crease in bilateral aid. This highlights the challenge of controlling for migration's effect on aid, as the 
reverse causality effect may be larger than the relationship of interest. The estimate of aid's effect on 
migrant flows may still be upwardly biased as the authors do not control for migrant stocks, which is 
likely to be positively associated with both aid and migration flows. Furthermore, Menard and Gary 
(2018) do not consider the effect of total aid, only bilateral aid.
The different effects of bilateral and total aid on migration are shown by Lanati and Thiele (2018). 
Using the standard 3SLS estimator, they show a small positive effect of bilateral aid on migration is 
completely offset by a larger negative effect of aggregate aid. While they emphasise the significance 
of these effects, the size is also important. When including year and country fixed effects, Lanati and 
Thiele (2018) report that a 1% increase in total aid, averaged over the three previous years, is associ-
ated with a reduction in emigration rates to OECD destinations of around 0.1%. No summary statistics 
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are presented, but this appears to be a reduction of only around 0.004 standard deviations. Consistent 
with the above, their results show that migrant stocks (proxying a migrant's network) are a more robust 
determinant.
While all of the papers above use regular migration, Dreher et al. (2019) address the specific case 
of refugees. They use data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
examine the determinants of (positive) changes in the stocks of refugees for 141 origin countries 
over the 1976–2013 period, regardless of where they now reside. To account for reverse causality, 
the authors rely on instrumental variables. They use a recipient country's probability of receiving 
aid and government fractionalisation as instruments, the latter measuring the fractionalisation in 
the ruling coalition of a country in terms of party affiliation. They argue that greater fractionalisa-
tion is positively correlated with the overall level of government spending in general and provides 
exogenous variation in the amount of aid disbursed. Their findings suggest that aid has no signifi-
cant impact on overall refugee stocks in the short term, but exerts a negative effect in the long run 
(after 11 years). When considering only OECD destinations, there is a positive short-run effect and 
the same negative long-run effect. When disaggregating aid into different types, humanitarian aid 
is reportedly more effective in reducing refugee flows in the short run: aid reduces refugee outflows 
as long as the share of humanitarian aid exceeds 9% of total ODA receipts.
Murat (2020) is another recent paper that moves away from a focus on regular migration. Using 
data on the flows of asylum seekers to many OECD destinations between 1993 and 2013, she esti-
mates the effects of bilateral aid and its interaction with sending country's GDP. Using system GMM, 
there is a negative association between bilateral aid and asylum applications from poorer countries (a 
GDP per capita of less than $787 at 2005 prices). For those countries, a 1% increase in bilateral ODA 
is associated with a 0.05% decrease in asylum applications in the following year. There is mixed ev-
idence over a longer time horizon, and for countries with a higher GDP per capita. There is no effect 
on regular flows.
How do we reconcile the literature's divergent findings? It is clear that the most positive effects 
are found when using migrant stocks as the dependent variable, or when excluding migrant stocks as 
a control. Such estimates are likely to be positively biased, given the endogeneity discussed above. 
Negative findings are found when including a broader set of controls, and using migrant flows as the 
dependent variable. While these negative effects are occasionally found to be significant, they are 
invariably small.
Standing back, research into migration and aid has a common set of problems. Alongside per-
sistent concerns about endogeneity, research into the effects (if any) of aid on migration is limited 
by data quality. There are no consistent and accurate data that measure the flow of irregular mi-
grants by year, ‘sending’ country, any transition countries and destination country. Research in this 
area then faces a trade-off. Dreher et al.'s (2019) approach is to use a dependent variable that is 
problematic (as discussed in Section 3; the measure is constructed from stocks which are influenced 
by many factors such as historical migration and changes in immigration status) but has wide cov-
erage: they sum all migrants with asylum status across all destination countries. This multi-destina-
tion approach is also taken by Murat (2020). We argue that our dependent variable more accurately 
captures the stated aim of donors (reducing flows of irregular migrants), but for a single gateway 
European country. This decision means we cannot detect any effects for irregular migrants taking 
other routes to Europe, or migrating to other continents. However, we are able to judge whether aid 
is successful according to the criteria that donors are most interested in, for an important and repre-
sentative entry point. In part, differences stem from different goals and the solution to problematic 
data is often to use more than one source in order to gain a more accurate picture: as such, we view 
our paper as complementary.
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3 |  EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We test for the effect of aid on irregular migration using panel data of dyadic aid and migration 
flows between Italy and sending countries. The panel data set covers 147 origin countries for the 
period 2003–16 (see Table A1 for the list of sending countries, which is restricted to eligible recipi-
ents of aid). The empirical specification is based on a basic gravity model for migration (Vogler & 
Rotte, 2000), with the inclusion of aid from Italy and all other donors. The resulting empirical speci-
fication is as follows:
where Italy ODA is aggregate bilateral ODA from Italy; Other ODA is the total aggregate ODA received 
by the origin country excluding bilateral aid from Italy; X is a vector controlling for variables related to the 
country of origin; Z is a vector controlling for factors related to the selected destination, such as bilateral 
immigration policies. Subscripts i and t are for the country of origin and year, respectively, with fixed ef-
fects denoted by µ and π. Given the focus on one destination only, a first concern is related to multilateral 
resistance (Bertoli & Moraga, 2013). Considering only dyadic variables would ignore the confounding 
influence that other destinations' attractiveness exerts on bilateral migration, thus leading to biased results 
(Hanson, 2010). However, year fixed effects absorb unobserved changes on alternative migration routes 
in any given year. In addition, we perform a specific robustness test including migration flows to other 
relevant destinations.
Other potentially important sources of endogeneity are home country conditions, bilateral links 
and reverse causality. Home country conditions refer to factors such as GDP per capita, a recent civil 
war or a natural disaster which would simultaneously make a country more likely to receive aid and 
make its citizens more likely to emigrate. If this is not controlled for, it may appear that there is a link 
between total migration and aggregate aid because they are both affected by such factors. Bilateral 
links relate to a specific dyadic link, such as the stock of migrants from a given country. This set of 
factors could positively influence both bilateral migration (as migrant stocks tend to attract further 
flows, due to network effects) and bilateral aid (Bermeo & Leblang, 2015). Reverse causality refers to 
the fact that a donor may disburse more aid to countries that send more migrants, or it might reduce 
assistance to the same countries punishing the lack of cooperation at stemming outflows.
Our strategy is twofold. First, we include a series of robustness checks that include variables that 
might affect the aid–migration relationship. Second, to address endogeneity we adopt the now standard 
approach of Berthélemy et al. (2009) in using a structural equation model. We include two variables 
of interest: aid from Italy and aid from all other donors. As we have no reason to think aid from other 
donors will be ‘less’ endogenous than Italian aid, we include each aid variable as a separate equation. 
While most other literature recognises the endogeneity of bilateral aid (e.g. Berthélemy et al., 2009; 
Lanati & Thiele, 2018; Menard & Gary, 2018; Murat, 2020), it is surprisingly rare for other aid to be 
considered as such. Because Italy is a main gateway to other European destinations, other donors are 
likely to be influenced by the migrant outflows from a country when allocating their aid.
Murat (2020) takes an alternative approach to tackling endogeneity by employing a system GMM 
model. If the instruments are valid, this is able to provide unbiased estimates of the relationship of 
interest. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. Hansen's J provides a test of instrument 
validity: a high p-value is needed to reassure the researcher that the (often numerous) instruments 
are valid. As Roodman (2009, p.142) points out, even p-values of 0.25 ‘should be viewed with con-
cern’. In Murat's (2020) core estimates (Table 1), p-values range from .068 to .198. Of the twenty 
results in the body of the paper, nine reject the null of correctly identified instruments at the 10% 
(1)MIGRATION = 1 Italy ODAit−1 + 2 Other ODAit−1 + 3Xit−1 + 4Zit−1 + i + t + 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level. Further, only two of the twenty relevant p-values are higher than 0.25, meaning most of the 
results should be viewed with concern. It is possible that the specification is at fault rather than 
the instruments per se, as an inability to convincingly pass the J test could be caused by omitted 
variables. Murat (2020) does not include variables on conflict or colonial links, which could affect 
both aid and migration. Further, only bilateral aid between a given destination and source country 
is included. That will likely ignore the majority of aid, potentially biasing results and causing the 
problems in the Hansen test.
These results are particularly concerning, as it is understandably rare for researchers to present 
their least convincing results, and there are many possible specifications. There are some arbitrary 
decisions with regard to the included regressors. For example, in a robustness check bilateral aid is 
included with lags of up to 6 years. A significant effect of aid on migration is found for the 1- and 
6-year lags (for low-income countries), but it is not clear whether a specification with five-year or 
seven-year lags would find any significant effect of aid on migration.1 The problem of ‘researcher 
degrees of freedom’ is compounded by the decisions over which instruments to use in GMM. Over 
1,000 instruments are used by Murat (2020), but it is not clear which ones, for example the number of 
lags that were used. Murat’s (2020) Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation in disturbances (the standard Arellano–Bond test) is strongly rejected (p = .002) in each 
case. The third-order test is sometimes significant at 10%. Depending on the lags used, the moment 
conditions and subsequent results may not be valid. Given these concerns, we do not use GMM as a 
method: the leading exponent of this approach does not appear to pass the relevant tests for instrument 
strength and may not pass the relevant tests for autocorrelation.
 1Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.
T A B L E  1  Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Ln(Regular) 2,248 4.48 2.72 0.00 12.51
Ln(Asylum) 2,365 1.75 2.34 0.00 10.19
Ln(Border) 1,359 1.30 2.48 0.00 10.59
Ln(ItalyODA) 2,378 8.81 6.89 0.00 20.70
Ln(Other ODA) 2,378 16.21 7.28 0.00 23.92
Ln(Immig. Stock) 2,241 6.43 3.07 0.00 13.97
Ln(GDPpc Origin) 2,271 8.10 1.32 5.27 11.89
Unemployment Origin 2,128 9.28 6.83 0.10 37.60
Ln(Pop Origin) 2,375 15.25 2.27 9.16 21.04
Dep. Ratio Origin 2,210 64.07 19.72 16.33 112.97
Political Freedom Origin 2,338 7.46 3.75 2.00 14.00
Immig. Policy Restrict. 2,377 19.18 6.00 5.00 26.00
Nat Disaster Origin 2,378 0.65 0.73 0.00 3.78
Conflict Origin 2,378 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Ln(Dist) 2,379 8.47 0.86 5.44 9.78
Colony 2,379 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00
Language Prox 2,365 0.13 0.15 0.00 1.00
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3.1 | Irregular migration to Italy
The term ‘irregular migrants’ is used to refer to all the migrants that have reached Italy without having 
previously fulfilled immigration policy requirements. This includes all new irregular arrivals, whether 
or not they subsequently prove a legal right to obtain international protection, and it excludes non-
geographical flows, such as new births and changes in the legal status. We focus on Italy because it is 
the port of entry for all migrants travelling on the Central Mediterranean route (CMR). Figure 1 plots 
the numbers of border crossings for major European routes. In every year, the Greek and Italian ports 
are the two main entry points. However, the Syrian crisis led to abnormally large inflows into Greece 
in 2015, making modelling that entry point more difficult. As such, focusing on Italy means focusing 
on one of the two main European gateways, and one without an obvious outlier. Averaging over the 
period, Greece accounted for 43% of yearly arrivals to Europe since 2009, while Italy accounted for 
37% (using data from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency; see Frontex, 2018).
Figure 2 shows that regular flows to Italy have decreased since a high in 2007. This mirrors an 
increase in irregular flows, using either measure. This shows the value of directly investigating irreg-
ular migration: it has a different trend, and any effects of aid are unlikely to be inferred from previous 
studies that use regular migration.
There are practically only two ways in which asylum seekers can currently reach a European 
country: resettlement and undocumented migration. The former has become increasingly rare in EU 
states, with less than 30,000 resettled refugees in 2015 and 2016 combined (UNHCR, 2017a). This is 
dwarfed by the numbers claiming asylum: there were 1,255,600 first-time asylum applications in 2015 
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alone (Eurostat, 2016). In response to the difficulties in using legal routes (Schuster, 2011), current 
refugees adopted a strategy of entering illegally before regularising their status. In Italy between 2008 
and 2016, less than 1% of refugees or those with international protection permits came into the coun-
try legally (i.e. through resettlement schemes). In other words, practically all of today's refugees were 
yesterday's irregular migrants. Over the same period, slightly under half of those claiming asylum 
were deemed eligible (Eurostat, 2017). We can infer from this that the category of asylum applicants 
is approximately equally split between future refugees and ‘economic migrants’.
3.2 | Description of dependent variable
The main innovation in this paper is using the flow of irregular migrants as our dependent variable, 
rather than the alternatives of changes in stocks of regular migrants or refugees. We use two such 
measures. First, from the UNHCR Populations Statistics Database we use the annual number of 
asylum applications lodged in Italy from 2003 to 2016. Second, we use the annual number of illegal 
crossings detected along the Italian segment of Europe's external border from the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, 2018). The data record arrivals and are available for 2009–16.
Both variables have weaknesses. First, they are liable to over-counting as a single individual could 
apply for asylum and/or attempt border crossing multiple times. As far as asylum applications are 
concerned, the likelihood is limited as additional applications are not recorded if the first application 
has been lodged in the same reference period (mainly the calender year). Moreover, the EURODAC 
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regulation establishes a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants entering 
the Schengen area so that every new application can be verified against already existing data. In the 
case of border apprehensions, we minimise the problem by focusing on the EU external border only, 
which excludes flows within the European Union. While aggregate numbers at the European level 
might be problematic as it is not clear how they relate to data published at the national level, this is not 
a problem if only the country level is considered (i.e. one destination). This is because an individual 
detected crossing into Italy might manage to continue his journey to be apprehended again in France. 
Thus figures at the aggregate European level can be inflated by double counting, but our Italian data 
are less affected by the issue.
Second, the opposite problem may be at work for the number of detained migrants. While some 
may be detected multiple times, others may immigrate without being apprehended. This is expected 
to be a minor issue, as the largely maritime border of Italy makes it relatively easy to detect illegal 
crossings (Hanson & McIntosh, 2016). Technical reports from both the European Commission and 
the Border Agency have repeatedly confirmed that the likelihood of a migrant being smuggled into 
Europe undetected is very limited (European Commission, 2016b). Third, we are interested in where 
migrants are from, but this is imperfectly recorded. This is a larger problem for apprehensions, as 6.3% 
are recorded as originating from ‘unspecified sub-Saharan’ or ‘unknown’ countries. This means there 
is under-counting for some countries. For asylum applicants, there is a better record, with only 1.56% 
of applications from individuals that are ‘stateless’ or of ‘unspecified/not stated’ origin. However, 
given the use of fixed effects, this would not bias estimates unless the likelihood for withholding in-
formation from authorities has varied differently for different origins between 2003 and 2016.
These weaknesses are outweighed by strengths. Both measures are based on flows rather than 
stocks, so they are unaffected by emigration or other changes in the status/residence of historical 
immigrants. Furthermore, they are of direct interest to donors. The border apprehensions measure 
represents the closest estimate of the real flow of irregular migrants, while asylum applications count 
irregular migrants that are attempting to regularise their status after reaching Italy. There are several 
reasons to use both. In particular, illegal border crossing data are only available after 2008. Because 
journeys to Europe take up to 3 years (Crawley et al., 2016) and the 2009–16 time frame is heavily 
affected by the 2008 financial crisis, a longer panel is preferable.
To give a sense of the data, Figure 3 plots these dependent variables for the top nine sending coun-
tries in the sample. We also include ‘change in refugee stocks’ for comparison, which uses the same 
underlying data as Dreher et al. (2019; see Section 2). While we retain the restriction that changes 
must be positive, the ‘Refugee Stocks’ data used here only refer to Italy (whereas Dreher et al., 2019, 
aggregate all destination countries).
In Figure 3, we limit the time period to nine years as the number of apprehensions at border is only 
available from 2009. All of the measures clearly show that irregular migration has risen sharply over 
the period. Our two chosen variables (asylum applications and apprehensions at border) often tell a 
similar story, though for Pakistan and Eritrea there is a less consistent picture. Across the data set, 
there is a correlation coefficient between the two measures of 0.60 (p < .0001, N = 1,351).
Turning to refugee stocks, we see they are almost always lower than the number of asylum ap-
plications or the number of apprehensions in any given year. This is because refugee stocks only in-
clude asylum applications with a positive outcome. Using stocks to infer flows appears problematic, 
as illustrated by the Eritrean data. Stocks for 2010–16 hover between 10,000 and 13,500. Looking 
at the change in stocks shows relatively large increases in 2010–14 (between 139 and 1,321) but are 
capped at zero for 2015 and 2016. A very different picture is given by looking at the other possi-
ble dependent variables. In 2016, 20,721 Eritreans were detected at the border, with 7,457 asylum 
applications.
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When comparing data used by Dreher et al. (2019) and this paper, there are a number of con-
siderations. First, the obvious difference is that we consider one gateway country (Italy) and many 
‘sending’ countries, whereas Dreher et al. (2019) aggregate all final destination countries where 
migrants have obtained asylum status, which can take several years. Second, as Dreher et  al.'s 
(2019) underlying data are based on stocks, all positive changes are interpreted as an increase in 
the flow of refugees, whereas falls in stocks are replaced by zeros. However, changes in stocks are 
also influenced by births, deaths and changes of visa types. Third, refugees have, by definition, 
obtained asylum. This is in part a political process that reflects the relationship with countries of 
origin. Furthermore, it excludes all pending applications, which in December 2016 for the EU to-
talled almost 900,000 (Eurostat, 2017). This may create bias, as the difference between pending and 
approved status can be very different for different countries of origin. Taken together, a flat level 
of stocks from a given country would be interpreted as no change in refugee arrivals. In reality, 
it could be a steady stream of asylum seekers with negative asylum outcomes, a large number of 
pending applications, or a steady stream of successful applications in tandem with refugees gaining 
other visa types.
Our asylum variable is similar to Murat's (2020), capturing the flow of bilateral asylum appli-
cations. We differ by focusing on only one entry point (Italy), as it proxies for the flow of irregular 
migrants in Europe as a whole. The EURODAC regulation and ‘Dublin regulations’ (Djajić, 2014; 
Schuster, 2011) make it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to file their applications in countries 
other than their place of first entry (i.e. Italy, Greece and Spain). The number of asylum applications 
in other European countries is largely determined by their geography, which limits their use in identi-
fying the role of aid in affecting irregular migration.
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3.3 | Main independent variables of interest
The main independent variable is yearly bilateral aid disbursed by Italy between 2002 and 2015. The 
more general effect of aid is captured by including all aid disbursed by other donors. In both cases, 
in-donor refugee costs and donors' administrative expenses are excluded.
3.4 | Control variables
Following the migration literature, we control for the main push and pull factors on migration. First, 
the stock of migrants from a given country captures current migrants' network. Second, we control for 
economic conditions at origin, while conditions at destination are absorbed by year fixed effects. At 
origin, we use GDP per capita and the unemployment rate. Including income at origin allows better 
accounting for budget constraints than simply controlling for the GDP ratio.2 The unemployment rate 
controls for labour supply not absorbed internally.
Third, we capture demographic factors using the origin country's population size and dependency 
ratio. Fourth, we control for the political environment at origin through political rights and civil lib-
erties as measured by Freedom House's Freedom in the World index. Fifth, to account for bilateral 
immigration policies, we use data from the DEMIG project (De Haas, Natter, & Vezzoli, 2014) to 
construct an index recording bilateral yearly changes in policy restrictiveness. Because immigration 
restrictions do not affect countries of origin to the same extent, we believe this allows a better con-
trol than simply including destination-year fixed effects. Each piece of legislation has been coded by 
DEMIG's researchers as ‘more restrictive’ (+1), ‘less restrictive’ (−1) or ‘no changes’ (0). We use the 
yearly sum to create a cumulative index for immigration policy changes. Because the DEMIG project 
only covers until 2013, additional information was collected from OECD International Migration 
Outlooks (OECD, 2015, 2016).
Sixth, to control for natural disasters, we use the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) created 
by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which provides a list of deadly 
natural events in given years. We also control for conflicts using data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset, compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University and 
the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), which records all 
episodes of armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state. UCDP defines con-
flict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in a calendar year’ (Strand, Wilhelmsen, & Gleditsch, 2017, p. 9). Because the 
natural disaster database includes events of small intensity (i.e. from 100 people affected and above), 
the related variable counts the number of events, whereas the conflict variable is a dummy.3
Finally, we measure ‘distance’ in terms of geography, history and language. We capture the simi-
larity of languages using an index accounting for the number of common words out of a list of 1,000 
items. Data on distances and languages have been drawn from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
 2For instance, a ratio of 6 could correspond to very different scenarios in terms of migration hump: (a) a case where income at 
destination is $48,000 and origin $8,000; (b) a case where income at destination is $30,000 and origin $5,000. While GDP 
ratio would predict the same migration outcome in both cases, in the former an additional income increase is expected to lead 
to less emigration, whereas the opposite is true for the latter.
 3Including both variables as dummies did not affect the results.
12 |   CLIST and RESTELLI
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) GeoDist and Language databases, respectively. To account for 
shared history and colonial linkages, we create a dummy variable that expands previous measures of 
colonial legacy (Rose, 2004). Drawing on postcolonial studies (Triulzi, 2006), we extend the concept 
to countries that were never formally part of the ‘Italian Empire’, but that were subjected to long-term 
military invasions, such as Albania and Ethiopia. These are only estimated in the absence of country 
fixed effects.
3.5 | Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics, with full descriptions and sources in Appendix (Table A2).
4 |  RESULTS
Baseline results are reported in Table 2, estimating (1) in six ways. Our chosen dependent variables 
(asylum applications and border apprehensions) are provided alongside estimates for regular migra-
tion, which is the current standard in the literature. Each specification is estimated using fixed effects 
for both year and origin, or just year. As outlined in Section 2, we expect positive coefficients for 
both aid variables. Aid from all other donors is expected to loosen budget constraints given that only 
a minority of observations in our sample are found at income levels above $6–8,000. Bilateral Italian 
aid additionally captures network effects.
Looking at the main variables of interest, we see small coefficient estimates on aid variables in 
all specifications. The number of asylum applications has a positive relationship with both types of 
aid. Italian aid is found to be significant (at the 5% level) but the effect size is small: a 1% increase in 
Italian aid is associated with a 0.017% increase in the number of asylum applications. The number of 
border crossings sees a more mixed picture, with Italian and total aid having opposite signs. However, 
the effects are still small. For regular migrants, the most common measure in the literature, we see the 
largest effect size by excluding country fixed effects. A 1% increase in total aid is associated with a 
0.03% fall in regular migration to Italy, an effect found significant at the 1% level. Once country fixed 
effects are included, the estimated effect size is much smaller and insignificant.
Previous migration has a much larger effect. A 1% increase in the number of immigrants already 
residing in Italy is associated with a 0.19% growth of asylum applications from that country. This 
effect size is over ten times larger than the equivalent for bilateral aid. The effect of the migrants' net-
work is even larger for regular migrants, which hints at the changing importance of different countries 
in different kinds of immigration. The largest irregular flows over the period have been from Eritrea 
(114,211), Nigeria (96,871) and Syria (63,244), whereas the largest foreign-born communities resid-
ing in Italy in 2016 were from Romania (1.1 million), Albania (467,000) and Morocco (437,000). This 
explains why the coefficient on migration stocks is currently smaller for irregular migration. We might 
expect this to increase in the future, as these newer ties deepen.
Turning to economic conditions at origin, a 1% increase in GDP per capita at home is associated 
with an almost equal (0.95%) reduction in asylum applications. The same sign is retrieved for border 
apprehensions, though the coefficient is smaller and not significant. The unemployment rate at origin 
is not a significant factor in explaining within-country differences.
Turning to demographic factors, the dependency ratio (i.e. the share of population of working age, 
defined as 15–64) does not appear to have a strong influence on immigration to Italy, once country 
fixed effects are included. Rather, population size at origin has the largest effect: a 1% increase in 
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T A B L E  2  Baseline regressions
Ln(Asylum) Ln(Border) Ln(Regular)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Ln(Italy ODA) 0.012 0.017** −0.012 −0.0056 0.00084 0.00074
(0.017) (0.0070) (0.023) (0.014) (0.0069) (0.0049)
Ln(Other ODA) 0.0040 0.014 0.00085 0.033 −0.033*** −0.012
(0.022) (0.016) (0.030) (0.031) (0.0077) (0.010)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.54*** 0.19** 0.40*** 0.19 0.85*** 0.50***
(0.069) (0.090) (0.081) (0.12) (0.022) (0.087)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −0.11 −0.95** −0.074 −0.23 −0.14*** −0.33*
(0.15) (0.40) (0.17) (0.80) (0.046) (0.18)
Unemployment Origin 0.019 0.024 0.024 −0.0076 0.011** 0.015
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.0049) (0.012)
Ln(Pop Origin) −0.13 −0.36 0.046 7.33*** 0.099*** 0.78*
(0.096) (0.65) (0.11) (2.27) (0.033) (0.42)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.017** 0.021 0.029*** −0.013 −0.0076*** 0.0022
(0.0086) (0.016) (0.010) (0.040) (0.0029) (0.0073)
Political Freedom Origin 0.10*** 0.082 0.071* −0.022 0.027*** 0.080***
(0.033) (0.056) (0.040) (0.10) (0.010) (0.026)
Immig. Policy Restrict. 0.55*** 0.68*** 0.26 −0.18 −0.0021 0.15***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) (0.049) (0.041)
Nat Disaster Origin −0.17 −0.024 −0.49** −0.14* 0.011 0.019
(0.15) (0.056) (0.19) (0.082) (0.053) (0.025)
Conflict Origin 0.81*** 0.37** 0.93*** 0.26 −0.045 0.014
(0.27) (0.15) (0.32) (0.20) (0.070) (0.057)
Ln(Dist) −0.32 −0.12 0.067
(0.20) (0.24) (0.074)
Colony −0.025 −0.040 −0.13
(0.67) (0.88) (0.16)
Language Prox −2.69*** −4.00*** 0.30
(0.80) (0.84) (0.29)
Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,143 1,143 1,956 1,956
R2 .57 .20 .46 .24 .94 .19
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. OLS includes year fixed effects; FE includes both year and origin fixed effects. Unless 
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the home population is associated with a 7% growth in border crossings. The median yearly popula-
tion growth in our sample is 1.47%, and so, much of the increase in irregular migration numbers is 
explained by the model as a direct result of population growth. This does not apply to the number of 
asylum applications.
The political freedom in the country of origin is a significant factor in explaining differences be-
tween countries for all measures of migration, but fixed effects results show that it is not a significant 
factor in explaining within-country differences in irregular flows. Thus in the short run, changes in 
political freedom are not significantly related to either measure of irregular migration, but they do 
explain some of the variation between countries (if country dummies are not allowed to soak up the 
majority of the differences).
By contrast, Italian political conditions do matter: restrictive bilateral immigration policy is found 
to be significantly and positively correlated with asylum applications. There are two possible reasons 
why we might expect more restrictive law making to be associated with more asylum applications. 
First, it may be that this is simply reverse causality. If Italy responds to greater flows with harsher laws, 
an apparent positive association may be found. In this explanation, any negative effect from stricter 
immigration laws, if it exists, is overwhelmed by reverse causality. Second, it may be that tougher 
laws on immigration mean that more migrants attempt to regularise their status through the asylum 
process: as legal paths become more difficult, migrants opt for irregular routes before attempting to 
become legal residents. This fits with the pattern of the coefficients, as there is a large, positive and 
significant coefficient on asylum applications but an insignificant and negative effect on border cross-
ings. The evidence is not sufficient to decide which explanation is correct, but it is clear that restrictive 
legislation is not an effective tool in the presence of other relevant drivers (Castles, 2004; Czaika & 
Hobolth, 2016). This is underlined by looking at regular migration: policy restrictions are found to 
have a positive and significant coefficient.
Confirming the importance of push factors, the presence of violent conflicts in the country of ori-
gin positively affects the number of asylum applications lodged in Italy. Conflict is associated with a 
53% increase in applicants from a given country. It also explains variance in the number of border ap-
prehensions between countries, but not short-run fluctuations within countries. Contrary to the posi-
tive effect of armed conflict, natural disasters do not seem to trigger more migration to Italy. It is found 
negative in every specification, which adds weight to the argument that natural disasters tend to foster 
short-distance migration rather than international flows (Piguet, Pécoud, & De Guchteneire, 2011).
The counter-intuitive negative signs retrieved for colonial ties and language proximity can be ex-
plained by the limited colonial experience of Italy and by most irregular migrants originating from 
countries that do not share linguistic roots with Italy. More than 40% of irregular migrants originated 
from countries where the language proximity index is zero. Language barriers and lack of shared his-
tory do not seem to work as a deterrent to irregular migration to Italy.
4.1 | Robustness checks
We now turn to a series of robustness checks, which are found in Tables 3–7 and Figure 4. The 
main variables of interest are largely unaffected by controlling for income levels, multilateral re-
sistance, FDI, remittances, trade, deeper lags of ODA variables and when estimating using 3SLS. 
In Table 3, we test the robustness of the results by splitting the sample into high- and low-income 
countries, in line with the migration transition hypothesis. We use a GDP per capita cut-off of 
$8,000 at purchasing power parity (Clemens, 2014; Dao et al., 2018). Above this threshold, in-
creases in income are thought to have a negative effect on migration, whereas below it additional 
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income is expected to increase migration. When the sample is restricted to low-income countries, 
we find a consistent pattern for all dependent variables. Bilateral aid has a positive effect on mi-
gration, while aid from all other donors decreases migration. This is found strongly significant for 
regular migration, but the effect size is small: a 1% increase in total aid is associated with a 0.04% 
decrease in regular immigration to Italy.
When considering ‘high’-income countries, we find a less consistent pattern. Aid from all other 
donors is positively and significantly related to asylum applications, while bilateral aid is found 




Low High Low High Low High
Ln(Italy ODA) 0.017* 0.016 0.010 −0.019* 0.0046 −0.0066
(0.0093) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.0055) (0.0085)
Ln(Other ODA) −0.035 0.025** −0.012 0.0066 −0.044*** −0.0045
(0.025) (0.011) (0.24) (0.0093) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.45*** −0.039 0.31 0.031 0.63*** 0.17*
(0.13) (0.10) (0.30) (0.031) (0.10) (0.086)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −1.57*** −0.63 −1.32 −0.59 −0.50** −0.15
(0.54) (0.51) (1.42) (0.81) (0.24) (0.31)
Unemployment 
Origin
0.066** −0.0094 −0.032 0.010 0.0074 0.015
(0.031) (0.025) (0.060) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Ln(Pop Origin) 0.17 −0.16 16.0*** 1.16 0.68 0.53
(1.57) (0.51) (4.00) (0.91) (0.93) (0.34)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.019 0.024 0.014 0.014 0.0021 −0.0041
(0.016) (0.017) (0.073) (0.022) (0.0091) (0.013)
Political Freedom 
Origin
0.17** −0.10** −0.023 0.00039 0.091** 0.038*
(0.073) (0.046) (0.13) (0.10) (0.036) (0.023)
Immig. Policy 
Restrict.
0.96*** 0.54*** −1.11** 0.076 0.61** 0.020
(0.27) (0.20) (0.46) (0.098) (0.30) (0.035)
Nat Disaster Origin 0.024 −0.040 0.047 −0.11* 0.0084 0.015
(0.075) (0.076) (0.13) (0.066) (0.035) (0.042)
Conflict Origin 0.42*** 0.18 0.32 0.28 −0.056 0.24*
(0.15) (0.29) (0.30) (0.19) (0.058) (0.13)
Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,109 885 596 547 1,098 858
R2 .29 .17 .40 .082 .29 .15
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Low: recipients with GDPcapita below 8,000 PPP$. High: recipients with 
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T A B L E  4  Robustness check: Multilateral resistance
Sample's income level
Ln(asylum) Ln(border) Ln(regular)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Ln(Italy ODA) 0.018** 0.020* −0.0072 0.010 0.00043 0.0042
(0.0076) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.0049) (0.0055)
Ln(Other ODA) 0.013 −0.031 0.027 0.0040 −0.0092 −0.044***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.031) (0.23) (0.0098) (0.013)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.18** 0.40*** 0.18 0.31 0.51*** 0.64***
(0.084) (0.13) (0.12) (0.30) (0.083) (0.10)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −0.83** −1.38** −0.086 −1.07 −0.37** −0.55**
(0.39) (0.53) (0.80) (1.44) (0.17) (0.23)
Unemployment Origin 0.015 0.050* −0.0081 −0.037 0.0084 0.0059
(0.020) (0.030) (0.022) (0.059) (0.011) (0.020)
Ln(Pop Origin) −0.61 −0.023 7.03*** 15.3*** 0.59 0.52
(0.63) (1.42) (2.23) (3.91) (0.42) (0.95)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.030** 0.029* −0.011 0.021 0.0060 0.0051
(0.015) (0.016) (0.040) (0.072) (0.0073) (0.0094)
Political Freedom Origin 0.057 0.14** −0.044 −0.048 0.083*** 0.094**
(0.053) (0.069) (0.10) (0.13) (0.026) (0.036)
Immig. Policy Restrict. 0.61*** 0.97*** −0.23 −1.28*** 0.19*** 0.62**
(0.18) (0.28) (0.21) (0.46) (0.042) (0.30)
Nat Disaster Origin −0.019 0.038 −0.14 0.028 0.018 0.0089
(0.054) (0.073) (0.082) (0.12) (0.025) (0.035)
Conflict Origin 0.30** 0.37*** 0.23 0.28 0.014 −0.053
(0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.30) (0.056) (0.058)
Ln(Asylum) DAC 0.32*** 0.36***
(0.068) (0.11)
Ln(Border) other routes 0.14** 0.15
(0.056) (0.096)
Ln(Regular) DAC 0.18*** 0.10
(0.060) (0.062)
Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,979 1,101 1,143 596 1,956 1,098
R2 .23 .32 .25 .41 .20 .29
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
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to have a weakly significant negative effect on the number of border crossings. The inconsistency 
in the higher income sample is perhaps a function of the smaller sample size. The main consistent 
finding is again of small effect sizes. The only strongly significant finding for the variables of 
T A B L E  5  Robustness check: Other international transfers
Sample's income level
Ln(Asylum) Ln(Border) Ln(Regular)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Ln(Italy ODA) 0.011 0.0100 −0.0048 −0.0023 0.0038 0.0066
(0.0076) (0.0098) (0.014) (0.020) (0.0058) (0.0068)
Ln(Other ODA) 0.0092 −0.038 0.032 0.038 −0.024** −0.044***
(0.018) (0.028) (0.031) (0.28) (0.0099) (0.015)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.21** 0.49*** 0.17 0.29 0.53*** 0.60***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.32) (0.10) (0.14)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −1.42** −2.05*** 0.23 −0.78 −0.35 −0.68*
(0.59) (0.74) (1.10) (1.93) (0.25) (0.35)
Unemployment Origin 0.024 0.050 0.017 −0.016 0.019 0.0041
(0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.072) (0.013) (0.020)
Ln(Pop Origin) 0.87 −0.25 10.2*** 16.3*** 1.96*** 0.32
(1.15) (1.84) (2.36) (4.28) (0.57) (1.07)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.022 0.027 0.0057 0.032 −0.00067 0.0090
(0.015) (0.017) (0.041) (0.081) (0.0075) (0.011)
Political Freedom Origin 0.039 0.13* −0.0075 0.010 0.071*** 0.095**
(0.054) (0.074) (0.11) (0.13) (0.027) (0.038)
Immig. Policy Restrict. 0.62*** 0.90** −0.20 −0.97* 0.087* 0.60
(0.20) (0.37) (0.20) (0.51) (0.046) (0.51)
Nat Disaster Origin −0.0078 0.039 −0.078 0.11 0.010 0.0025
(0.062) (0.084) (0.084) (0.13) (0.025) (0.038)
Conflict Origin 0.31** 0.34** 0.15 0.11 −0.030 −0.092
(0.15) (0.14) (0.23) (0.37) (0.059) (0.067)
Total FDI 0.026 0.048 −0.082 −0.18** −0.013 −0.013
(0.053) (0.050) (0.059) (0.085) (0.018) (0.017)
Total remittances −0.010 −0.030 0.024 0.028 0.012 0.0062
(0.035) (0.084) (0.041) (0.17) (0.014) (0.025)
Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,685 952 988 530 1,653 942
R2 .20 .28 .26 .40 .21 .27
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
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interest is that we should expect a 0.044% fall in regular migration to Italy for an additional 1% 
in aid from other donors. This finding is at odds with the migration hump hypothesis for aid, as 
it implies extra finance for low-income countries decreases regular migration. Looking at each of 
the three dependent variables, we do not find evidence that aid loosens the budget constraint in 
low-income countries.
In Table 4, we provide an additional control for multilateral resistance to migration, beyond the 
strategy of using year fixed effects (see Parsons, 2012, for a justification of this method). Our results 
T A B L E  6  Robustness check: Trade flows
Sample's income level
Ln(Asylum) Ln(Border) Ln(Regular)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Ln(ItalyODA) 0.020** 0.022 −0.00069 0.016 −0.0030 −0.0026
(0.0090) (0.014) (0.017) (0.035) (0.0060) (0.0069)
Ln(Other ODA) 0.012 −0.044 0.038 −0.073 −0.017 −0.038***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.033) (0.29) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.16 0.51** 0.22 0.68*** 0.46*** 0.59***
(0.10) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18) (0.11) (0.17)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −1.23** −1.72** −0.47 −1.68 −0.16 −0.32
(0.57) (0.68) (1.13) (1.54) (0.24) (0.27)
Unemployment Origin 0.036 0.086** −0.0038 −0.045 0.026** 0.019
(0.024) (0.042) (0.022) (0.085) (0.013) (0.023)
Ln(Pop Origin) −0.37 2.57 6.09** 17.4*** 0.78* 0.55
(0.73) (2.25) (2.35) (3.99) (0.40) (1.15)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.028 0.012 −0.012 −0.0060 0.0089 0.011
(0.019) (0.021) (0.042) (0.068) (0.0082) (0.010)
Political Freedom Origin 0.029 0.088 −0.068 −0.13 0.074*** 0.070*
(0.060) (0.082) (0.11) (0.13) (0.028) (0.037)
Immig. Policy Restrict. 0.69*** 0.94** 0.040 −0.86 0.14*** 1.21***
(0.19) (0.40) (0.25) (0.60) (0.045) (0.25)
Nat Disaster Origin 0.000068 0.039 −0.11 0.13 0.038 0.040
(0.065) (0.089) (0.091) (0.16) (0.024) (0.038)
Conflict Origin 0.42** 0.41** 0.36 0.25 0.033 0.0076
(0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.46) (0.060) (0.055)
Bilateral trade (%) 0.074 −0.0080 0.044 0.021 −0.0095 −0.017
(0.052) (0.060) (0.073) (0.14) (0.012) (0.024)
Trade Open. (GDP%) −0.091 −0.27 0.37 −0.040 −0.098 −0.0013
(0.29) (0.46) (0.63) (1.18) (0.15) (0.23)
Observations 1,578 792 901 420 1,553 789
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are potentially biased if the attractiveness of Italy as a destination has changed, relative to other coun-
tries. In order to control for such an effect, we introduce three additional variables (one per dependent 
variable), estimated for both the full and low-income samples. These capture contemporary flows to 
relevant alternative destinations: the number of asylum applications lodged in other DAC donors, the 
number of border apprehensions at other ports of entry to Europe and the total regular migration flow 
to other DAC members.
The variables of interest remain largely unchanged. Bilateral aid is again positive and significant 
for asylum applications, while the negative effect of total aid on regular migration from countries 
T A B L E  7  Robustness check: 3SLS estimates
Ln(Asylum) Ln(Border) Ln(Regular)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Ln(Italy ODA) 0.19 0.27 −0.063 −0.20 −0.20 0.058
(0.21) (0.27) (0.18) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
Ln(Other ODA) 0.16 0.26 −0.70 0.33 0.28 −0.075
(0.28) (0.41) (0.97) (1.30) (0.18) (0.25)
Ln(Immig. Stock) 0.14 0.21**,** 0.44 0.44*,* 0.37***,*** 0.56***,***
(0.15) (0.10) (0.31) (0.25) (0.14) (0.070)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) −1.12**,** −1.28***,*** 1.70 −0.94 −0.78**,** −0.32
(0.53) (0.43) (2.87) (1.18) (0.31) (0.24)
Unemployment Origin 0.019*,* 0.053*,* −0.055 −0.13 0.012*,* 0.0094
(0.011) (0.031) (0.075) (0.087) (0.0063) (0.018)
Ln(Pop Origin) 0.35 2.64 6.23***,*** 12.8***,*** 1.18**,** 0.30
(0.67) (2.26) (2.02) (3.83) (0.47) (1.44)
Dep. Ratio Origin 0.014 0.023 −0.0056 −0.0072 −0.0035 0.0019
(0.014) (0.018) (0.034) (0.039) (0.0099) (0.011)
Political Freedom Origin 0.12***,*** 0.35***,*** −0.025 0.024 0.089***,*** 0.11**,**
(0.039) (0.079) (0.074) (0.11) (0.025) (0.051)
Immig. Policy Restrict. 0.51***,*** 0.38 0.070 0.19 0.079 0.46*,*
(0.15) (0.48) (0.44) (0.65) (0.10) (0.26)
Nat Disaster Origin −0.11 −0.13 −0.14 0.13 0.053 −0.039
(0.082) (0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.052) (0.065)
Conflict Origin 0.31***,*** 0.31**,** 0.36 −0.0091 −0.024 −0.062
(0.12) (0.14) (0.27) (0.27) (0.081) (0.077)
Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,928 967 1,098 486 1,898 964
R2 .77 .77 .65 .80 .90 .96
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
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below 8,000 PPP$ is also robust to multilateral resistance. It should be noted that all three additional 
controls are found positive and significant for the full sample. This means that movements on other 
routes are complementary, suggesting that drivers in the countries of origin have been dominating 
over pull factors in specific destinations.
In Table 5, we add controls for FDI and remittances received by the countries of origin to our 
baseline specification. This helps control for other international transfers that may affect both aid 
and migration. We find a similar overall pattern. Comparing the variables of interest to the baseline 
specification, we see that the effect of bilateral aid on asylum applications is still positive, but loses 
significance and is about half the size. The negative effect of non-Italian aid on regular migration is 
now significant also for the full sample.
Looking at the new variables included, it is perhaps surprising that there are opposite signs 
for private remittances and foreign investments. While their impact has been questioned (De 
Haas, 2005), both types of international transfers could conceivably loosen the budget constraint. 
However, we find opposite signs for each dependent variable. In only one case is there a signif-
icant effect: FDI on border crossings from low-income countries. This is also the specification 
with the lowest sample size. We treat this set of results with caution, especially when combined 
with the well-known problems with the reliability of remittances data (Alvarez, Briod, Ferrari, & 
Rieder, 2015).
In Table 6, we include the country of origin's trade openness (total imports and exports on GDP) as 
well as the relevance of bilateral trade with Italy (as a share of total trade). Menard and Gary (2018) 
find that higher integration into international trade of source countries is associated with lower migra-
tion. By contrast, Berthélemy et al. (2009) find that bilateral exports from destination to origin country 
can contribute to the attraction effect. We do not find a robust link between migration and either total 
or bilateral trade. The variables of interest are estimated in the now familiar fashion: all effect sizes are 
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small, with a weakly significant effect for bilateral aid on asylum applications. Likewise, non-Italian 
aid is found to have a significant negative effect on regular migration, but only for a subset of coun-
tries. Neither is estimated with a consistent sign across the two irregular migration variables.
Next, we consider aid's effect on migration over a longer time period. It is plausible that aid affects 
migration with a lag of over one year. Figure 4 plots estimated coefficients retrieved in the baseline 
specification but lagging aid variables by between 1 and 8 years, keeping all other covariates un-
changed. The choice of 8 years is driven by Ln(Border) panel spanning over 9 years. The top row in the 
figure shows bilateral aid, while the bottom row plots total aid from all other donors. Each migration 
dependent variable is given in a separate column. Starting from asylum applications on the left, only 
one instance is significant at 5% (bilateral aid lagged 1 year). For border apprehension, the positive 
effect of others' aid is significant at 5% for 3- and 5-year lags. However, the estimated coefficients are 
remarkably similarly over time. The estimated effect of aid on migration is mostly small and insignif-
icant, regardless of the lag length.
In Table 7, we present the results from the 3SLS regressions. This is now the standard approach 
for addressing endogeneity concerns that stem from the joint determination of aid and migration. We 
include separate equations for bilateral aid received from Italy and total aid from all other donors. We 
follow Clist (2011) and related literature when choosing a parsimonious set of controls. Equation (1) 
is augmented by:
where ItaExports measures bilateral exports from Italy to origin countries as a proxy for Italy's commer-
cial interests; TradeOpen measures the trade openness of recipient countries.
From the 3SLS estimates, the main message is that the variables of interest are not significant. The 
familiar pattern is replicated: a positive link between bilateral aid and asylum applications and a nega-
tive relationship between other donors' aid and regular migration for low-income countries. However, 
the main message is simply that aid effects are small and/or not significant.
Other factors retrieve more robust associations. The role of the migrants' network is found to be 
positive for all dependent variables and always significant for the smaller sample. The effect size is 
largest for regular flows, confirming patterns discussed earlier. Similarly, the coefficients for income 
at origin remain significant and negative for asylum applications, and population is again found to 
be an important determinant of border apprehension. The presence of conflict is also confirmed as a 
robust determinant of asylum applications.
Looking at the determinants of aid (see Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix), our concerns regarding 
the endogeneity of total aid are confirmed. All measures of migration to Italy are significantly associ-
ated with total ODA from all other donors, and in the cases of asylum applications and regular entries, 
this is also true for Italian ODA. Aid is generally given in response to higher predicted numbers of im-
migrants to Italy. The only exception is recipient countries with GDP per capita below 8,000 PPP$ that 
fail to prevent their citizens illegally crossing Italian borders. This would be in line with the increasing 
practice, within the EU, of linking development aid to measures of border externalisation (e.g. Oette 
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exchange of financial support. Despite the problem of endogeneity, estimates of the variables of inter-
est are largely unaffected.
5 |  DISCUSSION
Rather than highlighting specific results that are found to be significant in a specific regression, we 
attempt to look at the whole body of evidence presented. We do this in order to lower the risk that we 
cherry pick significant but fragile results. We will start by considering each of the dependent variables 
in turn.
For asylum applications, the coefficients on Italian aid are always found to be positive, with effect 
sizes ranging from 0.01 to 0.27. In the twelve estimates reported, it is significant at the 5% level three 
times, and at the 10% level twice more. The largest significant coefficient is 0.020, meaning that a 
1% increase in bilateral aid from Italy to a given country is associated with a 0.020% increase in the 
number of asylum applications. To give an example of what this means, consider the case of Pakistan 
in 2016, which was the second largest Italian aid recipient and the second largest origin country for 
asylum applications. The results imply that increasing Italian aid by 1% (i.e. $438,484) would equal 
an increase of around 2.70 asylum applications. The parameter sizes equate one additional asylum 
application with an extra $162,198 (2010 prices) in bilateral aid. While this is statistically significant, 
it is a small effect. We also estimate the effect of total aid received by origin countries from all other 
donors, with effect sizes that range from 0.26 to −0.044. It is found significant only once, at the 5% 
level, with a coefficient of 0.025. This evidence provides very little support for donors' arguments that 
aid deters irregular migration, at least in the short run when it is measured using asylum applications.
For the number of border apprehensions, we find small effect sizes with inconsistent signs. The 
only significant effect is found in Table 3, where bilateral aid has a negative and weakly significant 
effect on border crossings for countries with a per capita income of over 8,000 PPP$. To give a sense 
of the effect size, consider the case of Iraq in 2016, which was the top bilateral aid recipient and the 
second largest sending country within the higher income sub-sample. The coefficient implies that 
additional $510,507 would reduce border apprehensions by 0.27 units. The cost per deterred border 
crossing is then $1,846,653 (2010 prices). This effect size is relatively high compared to other spec-
ifications and so can be thought of as bounding the range of true effect size. It is also worth noting 
that this single significant finding is found for a subset (countries with a per capita income over 8,000 
PPP$) and when using the dependent variable with smaller coverage. As such, the statistical power is 
smaller. More generally, the consistent picture is of very small effect sizes from aid on border cross-
ings compared to other determinants of migration.
Comparing the above with results for regular migration, a clear difference emerges. The coefficient 
of total aid is negative in all estimates for lower income countries. Leaving aside the 3SLS estimate, 
the other coefficients are always significant and fall within a narrow range (−0.044 to −0.038). The 
3SLS coefficient is larger (though not significant): a 1% increase in aid disbursements is associated 
with a 0.075% decrease in regular migration flows. Using Pakistan as an example, these effects imply 
an increase in aid from other donors of $46 million is associated with an eleven unit decrease in reg-
ular migrant flows to Italy. The largest effect we find for regular migration then implies a figure of 
over $4 million per deterred migrant. Thus, while the sign is more consistently estimated, we also find 
small effect sizes for regular migration.
Our results echo those from a recent attempt to look at aid's effect on refugee numbers. Dreher 
et al. (2019) find that the total aggregate aid received by a source country has no significant changes 
in overall refugee outflows in the short term. Over a longer horizon (12–15 years), they estimate total 
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aid deters refugee stocks: an increase in total ODA/GDP by one percentage point is associated with a 
28% decrease in refugee flows to the OECD. Prima facie, this appears to be a very large effect, but let 
us consider what this would mean for Pakistan. A one percentage point increase in aid/GDP in 2003–5 
is approximately $1.4 billion (in 2010 prices), which their estimates equate with a drop in refugee 
stocks in 2016 of 1,178. The estimated cost of deterring one migrant is about $1.2 million. Thus, while 
the long-term effect is found weakly significant and appears large, the actual effect size is unlikely to 
persuade donors that this is a good use of scarce aid resources.
Murat's (2020) results also imply large costs per deterred migrant, despite focusing on different 
kinds of aid and migration. She finds a significant negative association between bilateral aid and asy-
lum applications, for sending countries with GDP per capita below $787 (2005 prices). The largest 
effect is for countries in the lowest quintile (below $411 GDP per capita, in 2005 prices) and equates a 
1% increase in bilateral aid with a 0.05% reduction in asylum applications in the following year. Using 
the median values for migration and aid in that quintile, this translates into a 0.007 drop in asylum 
applications for an additional $74,100 spent in bilateral ODA. The cost per deterred asylum appli-
cation is just over $10.5 million. There is a range. It reduces to $3.6 million if only the most recent 
year (2013) is considered, and it increases to $18.6 million if only Italy is considered as a destination 
country.
Comparing our findings to other previous work, we inevitably compare to studies that focus on the 
effect of aid on regular migration. The results are remarkably similar in magnitude despite differences 
in aim, approach and the accompanying discussion. Consider the significant and negative effect of 
total aid on regular migration to OECD countries reported by Lanati and Thiele (2018). We do not find 
this to be significant, a difference which can partly be attributed to the potential endogeneity of total 
aid. The negative effect we consistently found in a fixed effects model from total aid on regular migra-
tion to Italy is not robust to 3SLS estimates including a third equation for non-Italian aid. Regarding 
effect sizes, coefficients cannot be directly compared because of different dependent variables: we 
use logged irregular flows, whereas Gamso and Yuldashev (2018a) and Lanati and Thiele (2018) use 
emigration rates. This means an illustration is required to compare effect sizes.
While Gamso and Yuldashev (2018a) refer to rural aid and Lanati and Thiele (2018) refer to total 
aid (per capita), they both find a 1% increase in (that kind of) aid is associated with a decrease in 
emigration rates of approximately 0.1%. Taking again the case of Pakistan in 2016, aid's potential 
deterring effect translates into a reduction of the regular emigration rate from 0.00764% to 0.00763% 
for an additional $0.24 in total aid per capita. Keeping population constant at 193 million, this would 
lead to a 15-unit decrease in regular migration flows to Italy from Pakistan, from 14,745 to 14,730 im-
migrants. This is more than $3 million in aid per deterred migrant (at 2010 prices). Our own estimates 
lead to a cost per deterred regular migrant that ranges from $4 to $7 million (2010 prices). While the 
coefficient sizes may appear to be different, the resulting estimates of cost per deterred migrant are 
remarkably similar.
Our results also support recent findings that financial constraints have a more limited effect than 
previously thought (Dao et al., 2018). We do not find support for the idea that by loosening budgetary 
constraints, foreign aid causes more migration (De Haas, 2007). Instead, we consistently find a nega-
tive association between income at origin and irregular migration to Italy, which is significant in most 
specifications. Higher per capita GDP in the country of origin leads to reductions in flows to Italy. 
Contrary to the prediction of the migration hump (Berthélemy et al., 2009; Clemens, 2014), we find 
the negative relationship with irregular migration to Italy is stronger for countries of origin below the 
8,000 PPP$ per capita threshold.
The role of income levels may of course be rather different for irregular migration than for regular 
migration. One difference is the much higher costs of illegal routes. Although the increased demand 
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has recently lowered the price (Europol, 2016), it is estimated that a journey from Libya to Italy re-
lying on smugglers costs on average $1,500 in current prices (Reitano & Tinti, 2015), whereas the 
cheapest journey from Eritrea could cost as much as $3,700 (Hamood, 2006). With prices so high, 
relatively small gains in income are of little consequence to irregular migrants. Rather, it is poverty, 
networks and conflict which drive irregular migrants, a set of findings which are robust across our 
specifications.
Turning to bilateral aid, our results agree with previous work that found individual donor countries 
have very limited ability to affect their immigration flows (Lanati & Thiele, 2018). While Berthélemy 
et al. (2009) found a strong positive effect, papers that use migrant flows as their dependent variable 
find smaller effects (Menard & Gary, 2018). Further, research that found a positive effect from aid 
on migration typically did not control for bilateral migrant stocks. Once the immigrants’ network and 
related attraction effect are accounted for, evidence shows that the effect of bilateral aid is negligible 
compared to that of the migrants' network (Lanati & Thiele, 2018). In this regard, our findings for 
Italy are also consistent with previous research on asylum seekers in Germany and Western Europe 
(Neumayer, 2005; Vogler & Rotte, 2000). Both Neumayer (2005) and Vogler and Rotte (2000) used 
bilateral aid as a proxy for bilateral contacts between donors and countries of origin in a fixed effect 
model and found no significant effects on the flows of asylum seekers.
6 |  CONCLUSION
A lot has been written on the link between aid and regular migration, often in response to donors' 
claims that aid is able to address the root causes of migration. We add to this literature by using new 
data on irregular migration, asking whether aid is an effective deterrent of asylum applications and 
border apprehensions in Italy. Our consistent finding, across dependent variables, types of aid and 
various specifications, is that the estimated effect size of development aid on migration is small. 
Inconsistently, effects are found to be significant.
While we contribute new data to the debate, we are also subject to at least four of the limitations 
of previous work. First, the strategies to deal with endogeneity are not wholly satisfactory. The di-
rection of the bias is known, but this problem is a persistent theme. Second, while we provide new 
data on irregular migrants, the distinction between transit and origin countries is still unexplored. Our 
solution is to examine one transit country, but much is not yet understood about the roles of different 
countries. For our specific question, that may give misleading answers. Although donors tend to focus 
more resources on countries of origin (Czaika & Mayer, 2011), it is possible that donors successfully 
affect migration by targeting transition countries (Dreher et al., 2019). Third, the effects of different 
types of aid are unknown. It may be that a specific subset of aid is effective at reducing migration, an 
effect that could be hidden by looking at total volumes. Separating this from fragile subgroup anal-
ysis will be particularly difficult, as a search for this type of effective aid could easily inadvertently 
resemble p-hacking. Fourth, the timing of any effects is difficult to model. It is likely that sustained 
aid disbursement affects migration over a longer period. As discussed in Section 3, there is a trade-off 
between adopting appropriate measures of migration flows and data coverage. We have opted for new 
data which is both more accurate and relevant, but face lower coverage. Further research would ideally 
address some of these problems.
We contribute to the debate on aid's effectiveness at deterring migration by using new data on ir-
regular flows to Italy. We find consistent evidence of very small effects. An apparent ‘attraction effect’ 
of bilateral aid is not found; the migrants' network plays a much larger role. For total aid, there is again 
a very small effect. We find no robust evidence that supports either a positive effect through loosening 
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budget constraints or a negative effect through closing income differentials. Further, the relevance of 
budgetary constraints and the migration hump hypothesis for irregular migration are also challenged 
by the effect of GDP per capita in source countries. The most optimistic case we can make from the 
evidence presented here is that the cost in bilateral aid per deterred border crossing is $1.8 million (for 
countries with a per capita income of over 8,000 PPP$). For regular migrants, the cost per deterred 
regular migrant is in the range of $4–7 million, which is similar to previous work. The most significant 
effect from the asylum data implies the opposite effect: we should expect one extra application for 
every additional $162,198 in bilateral aid. To conclude, aid does not appear to be an effective tool for 
deterring either regular or irregular migration.
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APPENDIX A
T A B L E  A 1  List of included countries
Recipient
Afghanistan Cuba Lesotho Sao Tome and Principe
Albania Cyprus Liberia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Djibouti Libya Senegal
Angola Dominican Republic Lithuania Serbia
Argentina Ecuador Macedonia, FYR Sierra Leone
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Madagascar Singapore
Azerbaijan El Salvador Malawi Solomon Islands
Bahamas Equatorial Guinea Malaysia South Africa
Bahrain Eritrea Maldives Sri Lanka
Bangladesh Estonia Mali St. Lucia
Barbados Ethiopia Malta St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Belarus Fiji Mauritania Sudan
Belize Gabon Mauritius Suriname
Benin Gambia, The Mexico Swaziland
Bhutan Georgia Moldova Tajikistan
Bolivia Ghana Mongolia Tanzania
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Montenegro Thailand
Botswana Guinea Morocco Timor-Leste
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Togo
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Myanmar Tonga
Bulgaria Haiti Namibia Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso Honduras Nepal Tunisia
Burundi Hong Kong SAR, China Nicaragua Turkey
Cabo Verde India Niger Turkmenistan
Cambodia Indonesia Nigeria Uganda
Cameroon Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman Ukraine
Central African Republic Iraq Pakistan United Arab Emirates
Chad Israel Panama Uruguay
Chile Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan
China Jordan Paraguay Vanuatu
Colombia Kazakhstan Peru Venezuela, RB
Comoros Kenya Philippines Vietnam
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kuwait Qatar West Bank and Gaza
Congo, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Romania Yemen, Rep.
Costa Rica Lao PDR Russian Federation Zambia
Ivory Coast Latvia Rwanda Zimbabwe
Croatia Lebanon Samoa
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T A B L E  A 2  Variable description and sources
Name Description Source Unit
Border Number of illegal border crossing detected per origin 
country (2009–16)
Frontex Detection
Asylum Number of asylum applications filed in Italy per origin 
country
UNHCR Applicant
Regular Number of migrants obtaining a residence permit in 
Italy
OECD Individual
Immigrant stock Number of foreign nationals residing in Italy OECD and ISTAT Individual
Italy ODA Aggregate gross disbursement from Italy to origin 
country
OECD/CRS USD 2015
Other ODA Total aggregate gross disbursement received by origin 
country excluding bilateral aid from Italy
OECD/CRS USD 2015
Pop Origin Total population in origin country WDI Individual
Dependency 
Ratio Origin
Share of population below 15 and above 64 WDI Rate
Unemployment 
Origin
Unemployment rate in origin country, ILO modelled WDI Rate





Political Rights and Civil Liberties are both measured 
on a one-to-seven scale, with 1 representing the 
highest degree of freedom, and then summed so that 




Each legislative measure is coded (+1 = more 
restrictive; −1 = less restrictive) and summed to 
obtain a yearly cumulative index per origin country
Own based on 
DEMIG
Index
Conflict Origin Dummy for violent conflict registered in a given year 




Number of natural hazardous events with more than 
100 people affected registered
EM-DAT Event
Distance GPS distance between Italy and origin country (capital 
cities)
CEPII Km
Language Prox Unadjusted value of linguistic proximity (ASJP), from 
0 to 1 (1 = same language)
CEPII Index
Colony Dummy for colonial linkages and common history 
(0 = No)
Own Dummy
FDI inflows Gross FDI inflows into origin countries at 2010 
constant USD
WDI USD 2010
Total remittances Total inflow of remittances into origin countries at 
current prices
World Bank USD 
current
Bilateral Exports Exports from Italy to origin countries (as share of 
origin country GDP)
Own based on 
UNCOMTRADE
Rate
Bilateral Trade Share of trade between Italy and origin countries (as 
share of total trade of country of oring)
Own based on 
UNCOMTRADE
Rate
Trade Openness Total exports and imports of origin countries (as share 
of origin country GDP)
Based on WDI Rate
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T A B L E  A 3  Robustness check: 3SLS estimates for bilateral ODA equations
Ln(Italy ODA) Ln(Italy ODA) Ln(Italy ODA)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Ln(Italy exp) 0.079 0.13 0.39**,** 0.47**,** 0.12 0.20
(0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) 0.33 1.13 −1.59 0.95 −0.16 0.32
(0.72) (1.27) (1.08) (1.89) (0.70) (1.04)
Ln(Pop Origin) −1.27 −4.07 −1.72 3.57 −1.95*,* −3.86
(1.07) (2.60) (4.97) (11.2) (1.11) (2.53)
Political Freedom 
Origin
−0.16* −0.35**,** −0.031 0.059 −0.18**,** −0.19
(0.083) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.088) (0.13)
Nat Disaster Origin 0.34**,** 0.47**,** −0.14 0.030 0.28*,* 0.43**,**
(0.15) (0.22) (0.18) (0.26) (0.16) (0.22)
Conflict Origin −0.095 −0.13 −0.067 −0.29 0.18 0.11









Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,928 967 1,098 486 1,898 964
R2 .82 .73 .89 .84 .81 .74
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
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T A B L E  A 4  Robustness check: 3SLS estimates for total ODA equations
Ln(Other ODA) Ln(Other ODA) Ln(Other ODA)
Full Low Full Low Full Low
Trade Open. 
(GDP%)
−0.0022 −0.0031 −0.0083 0.0045*** −0.0024 −0.0028
(0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0016) (0.0032) (0.0019)
Ln(GDPpc Origin) 2.57*** 0.37 3.51*** −0.37 1.90*** −0.52
(0.52) (0.48) (0.84) (0.35) (0.51) (0.33)
Ln(Pop Origin) −2.33*** −5.89*** −8.60** 1.45 −3.32*** −5.45***
(0.79) (1.01) (3.99) (2.09) (0.83) (0.84)
Political Freedom 
Origin
−0.15** −0.40*** 0.084 −0.044 −0.23*** −0.29***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.084) (0.028) (0.067) (0.043)
Nat Disaster Origin 0.15 0.040 0.12 −0.0078 0.084 0.063
(0.12) (0.086) (0.15) (0.050) (0.12) (0.072)
Conflict Origin −0.13 −0.10 −0.13 0.0047 0.23 0.23*










Year FE x x x x x x
Origin FE x x x x x x
Observations 1,928 967 1,098 486 1,898 964
R2 .90 .58 .93 .89 .90 .70
Time frame 2003–16 2009–16 2003–16
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Low: sample includes recipients with GDPcapita below 8,000 PPP$.
*p < .10. 
**p < .05. 
***p < .010. 
